The moment text goes to a service outside your boundary, it has left. Retention, access and physical location follow the provider terms rather than your handling requirements, and the transfer completed before anyone reviewed it. Everything downstream of that moment is remediation.
Can we use AI
in this environment?
The question arrives as a procurement question and turns out to be an architecture question. Two free tools on this page work through it in the order the answer actually depends on: first what your data and your boundary allow, then what it would take to run AI with no cloud dependency at all. Both run entirely in your browser. Nothing is sent anywhere unless you ask for it.
Do not enter classified information or CUI. Planning-level answers only.
The problem is where the data goes, not which model is best.
A team with real work to do finds a capable model, and then hits a wall that has nothing to do with capability. The data is Controlled Unclassified Information, or export controlled technical data, or simply proprietary enough that nobody wants to explain later where it went. The environment has filtered egress, or none. A contract clause reaches the data. Somewhere in the organization a person has to answer for the handling, and there is no architecture yet to point at.
Most AI tooling assumes an internet connection the way it assumes electricity. In an enclave, on a disconnected network, or inside an accredited facility, that assumption fails quietly: a library that phones home, an update path that needs a public repository, a telemetry agent nobody looked at.
The pilot works. Then someone asks what an assessor will read: who asked what, what was retrieved, what the model returned, what action followed, and who accepted it. Evidence designed in is a log. Evidence added afterward is a project.
The data owner, the security officer, the contracting officer and the mission owner each hold a piece of the answer, and the question stalls between them. Naming which piece is missing usually moves it further than another vendor demonstration.
The failures repeat, and they are predictable.
- Controlled information is pasted into a commercial model by someone doing their job well and quickly, because policy was the only control in the path.
- A model is selected before the boundary is settled, so the architecture is chosen twice and paid for twice.
- The provider terms that were read are the public terms page, and the enterprise agreement says something different about retention.
- An air-gapped pilot succeeds and then cannot be updated, because nobody designed how a new model version crosses the boundary or who authorizes it.
- Retrieval is bolted onto a document store that does not enforce access rules, so a query returns something the asker could not have opened directly.
- Observability comes from a library that sends telemetry outward by default, and the finding arrives from the network team rather than the vendor.
- An approval step exists but is satisfied by clicking through a notification, which produces a log entry rather than an approval.
- The model is asked to make an access or marking decision, which is a rule an assessor can test being replaced by a judgment nobody can.
- Patching stops, because the environment has no reachable repository and no staged path was built.
- The evidence request arrives from outside the team, and the answer is a screenshot.
Short answers to the questions behind the question.
Can AI run in an air-gapped environment?
What does CUI-safe AI architecture require?
Why is AI governance an architecture problem as well as a policy problem?
When should deterministic controls override model judgment?
What should human approval look like in sensitive automation?
Tool one: can we use AI in this environment?
Eleven questions about the data, the boundary and the consequence. The result names one or more architecture categories worth evaluating, why your answers led there, what to ask a vendor or a security officer next, and what this tool cannot decide. It does not produce a score, because a number would suggest a precision the answers do not carry.
Do not enter classified information or CUI. Planning-level answers only.
Tool two: what would it take to run AI without cloud dependency?
Fourteen dimensions, each with what has to exist for a disconnected deployment to be real. Mark each one in place, not in place, or not sure. The picture below shows what rests on what, and a sensible order to work in. No costs here: the sequence is the useful part, and the numbers depend on the site.
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Where Salian fits, once the architecture is settled.
Architecture first. When the boundary, the data question and the evidence requirement are settled, these are the pieces Salian brings, described by what they do and who uses them.
Controlled AI workflow orchestration with signed human approval. For mission and program teams that need a named person to accept a specific action before it takes effect, and a record of that acceptance that someone else can read later.
Defines and evaluates the boundary policy an AI system must respect: what to allow, what to redact, what to block. For security officers and engineering teams who need the rule written where it can be tested rather than restated in a memo.
The retrieval layer shared by the Hawk products. For teams that need answers grounded in their own documents, with retrieval that respects the access rules the source material already carries.
Where a mission workflow needs something no product provides: ingestion into a constrained environment, transfer and update paths across a boundary, evidence pipelines, and the integration work between systems that were never designed to meet.
The decisions belong to the authorities that hold them.
- Authorizing Officials authorize systems. Nothing on this page is an authorization, and no result here anticipates one.
- The applicable Accrediting Official or Cognizant Security Authority accredits facilities and sets the rules for the boundary a system sits in, including media transfer.
- CMMC certification rests with an authorized C3PAO or the Department of Defense.
- DCSA, or the applicable Cognizant Security Agency, determines facility clearances.
- Your data owner decides how a specific record is categorized and marked.
- Your contracting officer reads the clause that governs the data. So should you, before an architecture is selected.
Outputs describe readiness categories and open questions. They are not accreditation, authorization, or certification decisions. Accreditation is determined by the applicable Accrediting Official or Cognizant Security Authority; CMMC certification by an authorized C3PAO or the Department of Defense; system authorization by the Authorizing Official. Do not enter classified information or CUI.
What happens after you run the tools.
- You get the result on screen. It stays in your browser. Read it, copy it, close the tab, and nothing has left.
- If you want a second read, the optional summary at the end of tool one sends your answers and the categories to Salian, and only when you press the button.
- The first conversation is unclassified and costs nothing but the time to describe what you are trying to accomplish, at planning level.
- If the honest answer is that you need a security review before any architecture, we will say so, and it is usually a short conversation rather than an engagement.
- If the answer is an on-premise or disconnected build, the next step is a scoped look at the fourteen dimensions in tool two against your actual environment.
Where the regulatory references come from.
These are the authorities behind the language on this page. They are starting points for your own reading and for legal review, not a determination.
- Controlled Unclassified Information program, 32 CFR Part 2002. The implementing directive for the CUI program established by Executive Order 13556, with the CUI Registry maintained by the National Archives and Records Administration.
- NIST SP 800-171, Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information in Nonfederal Systems and Organizations. Revision 2 is the text DoD contracts pin through a class deviation; NIST published Revision 3 in May 2024 and withdrew Revision 2 at the NIST level. Check which revision your contract names.
- DoD Cloud Computing Security Requirements Guide, Impact Level definitions. Defines the Impact Levels used to describe what data a cloud offering may hold, including the boundary between publicly releasable and controlled unclassified information.
- DFARS 252.204-7012, Safeguarding Covered Defense Information and Cyber Incident Reporting. The clause that carries NIST SP 800-171 onto defense contracts and sets the cyber incident reporting obligation. Clause text dated May 2024 at retrieval.
- Export Administration Regulations (EAR), 15 CFR Parts 730 to 774. Governs dual-use technical data, including release to a foreign person. Sending technical data to a service that can be read abroad is the exposure to design against.
- International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), 22 CFR Parts 120 to 130. Governs defense articles and defense technical data, with its own rules on release to foreign persons.
Regulatory references above are high level and current as of the retrieval date shown. Requirements change, and the clause in your contract governs over any summary of it.
Describe the environment, not the data.
Tell us the data category, the boundary, the connectivity and what the workflow has to do. That is enough to have a useful conversation, and it requires nothing controlled. We will tell you which of the categories above fits, what we would want to see before recommending an architecture, and where the honest answer is that a security review comes first.